{"id":1976,"date":"2026-03-13T07:57:59","date_gmt":"2026-03-13T05:57:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thedefencenews.com\/?p=1976"},"modified":"2025-12-31T18:46:14","modified_gmt":"2025-12-31T16:46:14","slug":"the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-the-us-navys-surface-fleet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thedefencenews.com\/?p=1976","title":{"rendered":"The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the US Navy\u2019s Surface Fleet"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Steven Wills<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

The U.S. Navy surface warfare enterprise has had several developments to cheer about in 2025.<\/p>\n

\n
\n
First, the AEGIS combat system works, and it does so under wartime conditions in the Red Sea. The surface forces\u2019 Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI)<\/a>\u00a0program appears to be a big success and a key element in preparing and sustaining ships in combat conditions.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

The DDG-51\u00a0Arleigh Burke\u00a0<\/em>class destroyer demonstrates that it is perhaps\u00a0the indispensable surface warship of the age<\/a>, and a true \u201cjack of all trades\u201d in the tradition of the destroyer platform. Even the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) has seen some rehabilitation with USS\u00a0Indianapolis\u00a0<\/em>playing a role<\/a>\u00a0in downing Houthi drones in a Red Sea engagement.<\/p>\n

Unfortunately, a number of severe readiness challenges continue to affect the surface fleet, in terms of its\u00a0vanishing cruiser force<\/a>, crippling redesign of the\u00a0Constellation\u00a0<\/em>class frigate, poor readiness of the\u00a0amphibious fleet<\/a>\u00a0and problems with the Landing Ship Medium program.<\/p>\n

Despite the service\u2019s focus on 2027 as \u201cder tag\u201d for a potential fight with the Chinese military, the overall size of the fleet is expected to decrease through the current decade and not start to ramp back up until 2030. Eighty percent surge readiness and a larger fleet seem incompatible goals for the near future.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s good with the surface Navy<\/strong><\/h5>\n

The surface fleet\u2019s tactical performance in the Red Sea seems due to a long effort from the return of schoolhouse training for new surface officers in 2012 after the debacle of \u201c<\/p>\n

\n
Surface Warfare Officer School in a Box<\/a>,\u201d through reforms implemented after the disastrous\u00a02017 collisions in the Western Pacific<\/a>.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

The WITI program is proving its worth, and the\u00a0Arleigh Burke\u00a0<\/em>class destroyers, now the solid backbone of the surface navy, performing very well in the arguable medium to high-end threat environment of the Red Sea region.<\/p>\n

The Navy expended\u00a0a lot of ordnance<\/a>\u00a0so far in the Red Sea mission, but that should be no surprise given current\u00a0doctrine for air and missile defense<\/a>, and the fleet\u2019s extended defensive posture protecting free commerce and just being present as a deterrent force.<\/p>\n

Navy Capt. Wayne Hughes, the late naval tactics expert from the Naval Postgraduate School, advised surface forces to\u00a0avoid a defensive posture<\/a>\u00a0as they are more susceptible to missile attack and vulnerable to damage when so employed. The Trump administration recently reversed this posture and is engaged in a more extended air and missile campaign against the Houthis.<\/p>\n

In addition, unmanned units like the\u00a0DARPA\u00a0Defiant\u00a0<\/em>prototype<\/a> with 16 vertical launch system cells. Soon, every DDG-51 commander may become a flotilla leader with multiple unmanned ships providing additional weapons, electronic warfare support and fuel for the manned vessel.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s wrong with the surface Navy<\/strong><\/h5>\n

Surface Warfare readiness overall is insufficient for a long, peer war against China or Russia. An aging,\u00a0over deployed fleet<\/a>\u00a0that has seen\u00a0persistent deferred maintenance<\/a>\u00a0over the last two decades cannot be fixed overnight, or by fervent sloganeering\u00a0that 2027 is nigh and 80% surge readiness<\/a>\u00a0is the goal.<\/p>\n

Keeping\u00a0one third of the fleet constantly deployed<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 -with\u00a0limited shore sustainment<\/a>\u00a0infrastructure and literally none at sea as the Navy\u00a0possesses only two tenders<\/a>, while supporting surge missions like that in the Red Sea\u2013 \u00a0will continue to harm overall surge readiness for a potential peer opponent fight.<\/p>\n

Even with 2027 as a goal for \u201cwar readiness,\u201d the fleet continues to shrink in size<\/a> and decommissioned ships still scavenged for parts or, worse yet scrapped. Every ship will be needed in a future fight, and it seems a poor readiness choice to\u00a0decommission any ship ahead<\/a>\u00a0of 2027.<\/p>\n

Last but not least\u2014the ugly<\/strong><\/h5>\n

What is happening today with the FFG-62\u00a0Constellation\u00a0<\/em>class frigate and the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) is just ugly. And given what happened with the\u00a0Littoral Combat Ship (LCS<\/a>), the Navy has not learned any useful lessons in managing ship design and construction.<\/p>\n

By all accounts, the Franco-Italian parent design for FFG-62, the FREMM frigate, is\u00a0a high-performing vessel<\/a>\u00a0in the service of multiple allied navies. The Navy should have left it alone under a U.S. build, at least for the first several units, a process of batch construction that has been around since before World War II. The approach would have allowed the Navy to refine a design over several\u00a0\u201cflights\u201d<\/a>\u00a0of ships.<\/p>\n

The Navy secretariat owns ship construction through its oversight of individual ship classes through the various Program Executive Offices (PEO\u2019s) charged with their building. U.S. and foreign ship designs are usually different in many ways and no doubt the PEO\u2019s followed the rules and set about\u00a0making changes to the FREMM design<\/a>\u00a0to make it U.S. compliant. The incoming Navy secretariat and next CNO must tackle the\u00a0Constellation\u00a0<\/em>class problems immediately upon taking up their respective positions.<\/p>\n

Get real on Navy challenges to get better<\/strong><\/h5>\n

The \u201cGet Real, Get Better\u201d<\/a>\u00a0slogan seems to be working at the tactical, ship and task force level, but perhaps not as much at higher levels of service leadership. The Navy is not large enough to sustain one-third of its number constantly deployed and still support unplanned surge operations like that in the Red Sea. The current construct is harming the overall readiness of the Navy, and leadership needs to talk about this.<\/p>\n

The Navy needs either more ships to better sustain rotational force deployment or fewer deployment missions to better preserve readiness for a peer competitor fight. The Navy can build many unmanned vessels such as\u00a0Defiant\u00a0<\/em>in several small shipyards, which can help improve the fleet\u2019s strength for a peer competitor fight.<\/p>\n

The Navy needs to freeze design changes to FFG-62 need and build a workable first flight of five vessels. The Navy must enforce accountability in readiness and ship construction at all levels of leadership.<\/p>\n

The goals should be realistic, and if the Navy uses real-world numbers, such as the size of fleet or percent of ready ships, then there should be a reasonable pathway to success. If the Navy is really going to get better in terms of readiness and fleet size, then it must get real about its challenges and set attainable goals for success.<\/p>\n

Steven Wills is the navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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